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Abstract
This paper argues that the slow U.S. recovery after the 2008–2009 recession was due to sluggish government spending. The analysis uses a structural
macroeconometric model. Conditional on government policy, the errors in
predicting output for the 2009.4–2017.4 period are within what one would
expect historically. Productivity and labor force participation are endogenous
variables in the model, and so their behavior in this period is a consequence
of the slow growth rather than a cause.

1 Introduction
U.S. output expanded more slowly after the 2008–2009 recession than might have
been expected historically. Why? This paper argues that the slow recovery was
due to sluggish government spending. Conditional on government policy, there
is no puzzle. A structural macroeconometric model of the United States, denoted
the “US model,” is used in the analysis. The results show that conditional on
the exogenous government policy variables, the errors in predicting output for the
2009.4–2017.4 period are within what one would expect historically.
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To get a quick picture of the argument, Figures 1–3 plot three government
spending variables for the 2009.4–2017.4 period. Figure 1 plots federal government purchases of goods in real terms, variable COG in the model. This variable
fell from the end of 2010 to the end of 2013 and then remained flat. Figure 2 plots
federal transfer payments to households in real terms, variable T RGHQ in the
model. Due to the stimulus measures, transfer payments remained high until the
fourth quarter of 2010, then fell rapidly to 2012, and then only slowly recovered
after that. State and local government spending also contributed to the problem.
Figure 3 plots state and local government purchases of goods in real terms, variable
COS in the model. This variable fell substantially to 2013 and then only slowly
recovered.
Much of the discussion of the sluggish output growth after 2009 has focused on
productivity. An important recent paper is Fernald, Hall, Stock, and Watson (2017)
(FHSW), who focus on the slow growth of total factor productivity and the decline in labor force participation. However, because of labor and capital hoarding,
total factor productivity is endogenous—it depends on output. Also, labor force
participation depends on the state of the economy and so is endogenous. Productivity and labor force participation are not exogenous driving forces that explain
the disappointing recovery, but rather consequences of whatever the driving forces
are. In the US model productivity and labor force participation are endogenous
variables. It will be seen that their sluggish behavior is a consequence of the slow
recovery caused by exogenous government spending decisions. The US model is
briefly discussed in Section 2, and the solutions are discussed in Section 3.
This paper is not the first to point out that sluggish fiscal policy may have
contributed to the slow growth after 2009. Eichengreen (2015) cites contractionary
U.S. fiscal policy in 2011–2013, although he provides no estimates of the effects
on the economy. FHSW (2017, pp. 52–53) point out the sluggish federal and
state and local government expenditures following the 2008–2009 recession, but,
as noted above, their emphasis is on low productivity growth and declining labor
2

Figure 1
COG: Federal Government Purchases of Goods
Billions of 2009 Dollars at Quarterly Rates
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Figure 2
TRGHQ: Federal Government Transfer Payments to Households
Billions of 2009 Dollars at Quarterly Rates
2009.4--2017.4
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Figure 3
COS: State and Local Government Spending on Goods
Billions of 2009 Dollars at Quarterly Rates
2009.4--2017.4
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force participation.1
Kydland and Zarazaga (2016) provide an alternative explanation of the slow
recovery. Using a calibrated model they argue that fears of a switch to a highertax regime after the 2008-2009 account for much of the slow recovery. Baker,
Bloom and Davis (2015) show that their measures of uncertainty are high during
much of the slow-growth period, arguing that uncertainty may be a cause of slow
growth. Hansen and Ohanian (2016) stress productivity shocks and other supply
side shocks as causing much of the slow growth, as does Ohanian (2017) in his
review of Eichengreen’s book.

2 The US Model
The US model uses the methodology of structural macroeconometric modeling,
sometimes called the “Cowles Commission” (CC) approach, which goes back at
least to Tinbergen (1939). I have gathered my research in macroeconomics in
one document, Macroeconometric Modeling: 2018 (M M ), on my website, and
this document contains a complete description and listing of the US model. M M
is written using the current version of the US model (January 30, 2018), where
published results using earlier versions of the model have been updated.2 The US
model is not explained in this paper, and one should think of M M as an appendix
to it. When appropriate, I have indicated in this paper in brackets the sections in
M M that contain relevant discussion. This paper is thus not self contained. It is
too much to try to put all the relevant information in one paper, hence the use of
M M as an appendix. The methodology of the CC approach is also discussed and
1

Some of the comments in the discussion of the FHSW paper argue that more emphasis should
have been given to aggregate demand effects in explaining the slow recovery.
2
Users can work with the US model on line or can download the model and related software
to work with it on their own computer. If the model is downloaded, it can be modified and
reestimated. Many of the results in M M can be duplicated on line. The US model is a subset of
a larger multicountry model, the MC model, but for purposes of this paper the US model has been
used alone.
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defended in M M [Section 1.1].
In the US model there are three estimated consumption equations, three investment equations, an import equation, four labor supply equations, two labor demand
equations, a price equation, a nominal wage equation, two term structure of interest
rate equations, and an estimated interest rate rule of the Federal Reserve, among
others. In the interest rate rule the Fed is estimated to respond to inflation and
unemployment. There are a total of 25 estimated equations and about 100 identities. The unemployment rate is determined by an identity; it equals unemployment
divided by the labor force. In the identities all flows of funds among the sectors
(household, firm, financial, state and local government, federal government, and
foreign) are accounted for. The federal government deficit is determined by an
identity, as is the federal government debt. There is an estimated equation determining the interest payments of the federal government as a function of interest
rates and the government debt.
The estimation period is 1954:1–2017:4, and the estimation technique is 2SLS.
The estimation accounts for possible serial correlation of the error terms. When
there is serial correlation, the serial correlation coefficients are estimated along
with the structural coefficients. Identification is not a problem in this analysis.
Many variables are excluded from each equation. Consistent 2SLS estimation of
an equation requires that the first stage regressors be uncorrelated with the error
term. Government policy variables and exports are used as first stage regressors
in most equations, but always with a lag of one quarter to avoid any possible
correlation of the current values of the variables and the error term. (Remember
that any serial correlation of the error term has been eliminated in the estimation.)
Table 1 presents the variable notation used in this paper. M M [Section 6]
provides a complete description of the variables. It also includes a list of the first
stage regressors in each equation. The variables are quarterly time series variables.
For ease of notation, time subscripts have not been used here.

5

Table 1
Variables in the US Model Referred to in this Paper
Variable

Type

Description

AA
cnst
cnst2

endo
exog
exog

COG
COS
D593
E
GDP D
HF
HF S

exog
exog
exog
endo
endo
endo
exog

JF
JG
JHM IN
JM
JS
KK
L1
L2
L3
LAM

endo
exog
endo
exog
exog
endo
endo
endo
endo
exog

LM

endo

PH

endo

P OP
P OP 1
P OP 2
P OP 3
P ROD
T
T RGHQ
UR
WA

exog
exog
exog
exog
endo
exog
exog
endo
endo

Y

endo

Total net financial and housing wealth, h, B2009$.
Constant term.
0.0 before 1969:1, 0.0125 in 1969:1, 0.0250 in 1969:2, ... , 0.9875
in 1988:3, and 1.0 thereafter.
Purchases of consumption and investment goods, g, B2009$.
Purchases of consumption and investment goods, s, B2009$.
1 in 1959:3; 0 otherwise.
Total employment, civilian and military, millions.
GDP price deflator.
Average number of hours paid per job, f, hours per quarter.
Long-run desired value of HF , computed from peak-to-peak interpolations of HF .
Number of jobs, f, millions.
Number of civilian jobs, g, millions.
Number of worker hours required to produce Y, millions, Y /LAM .
Number of military jobs, g, millions.
Number of jobs, s, millions.
Stock of capital, f, B2009$.
Labor force of men 25-54, millions.
Labor force of women 25-54, millions.
Labor force of all others, 16+, millions.
Amount of output capable of being produced per worker hour, computed from peak-to-peak interpolations of Y /(JF · HF ).
Number of“moonlighters": difference between the total number of
jobs (establishment data) and the total number of people employed
(household survey data), millions.
Price deflator for consumption plus housing investment inclusive
of indirect business taxes
Noninstitutional population 16+, millions.
Noninstitutional population of men 25-54, millions.
Noninstitutional population of women 25-54, millions.
Noninstitutional population of all others, 16+, millions.
Output per paid for worker hour ("productivity"), Y /JF · HF ).
1 in 1952:1, 2 in 1952:2, etc.
Transfer payments (net), g to h, B2009$.
Civilian unemployment rate.
After tax wage rate. (Includes supplements to wages and salaries
except employer contributions
for social insurance.)
6
Total production, f, B2009$.

• h = household sector, f = firm sector, g = federal government sector.
• s = state and local government sector.
• B2009$ = Billions of 2009 dollars.

Production Technology
The production function of the firm sector is postulated to be one of fixed proportions in the short run:
Y = min[LAM · (JF · HF a ), M U · (KK · HK a )],

(1)

where Y is production, JF is the number of workers employed, HF a is the number
of hours worked per worker, KK is the capital stock, HK a is the number of hours
each unit of KK is utilized, and LAM and M U are coefficients that may change
over time due to technical progress. The variables Y , JF , and KK are observed;
the others are not. For example, data on the number of hours paid for per worker
exist, HF in the model, but not on the number of hours actually worked per worker,
HF a , unless the two are the same.
If JF · HF is greater than JF · HF a , there is excess labor on hand, i.e., more
labor than is needed to produce the level of output of the quarter. Because of
adjustment costs, when output falls, firms may not decrease labor hours as much
as they could to produce the level of output, which leads to excess labor. Excess
labor is measured here from peak-to-peak interpolations of the log of Y /(JF ·HF ),
depicted in Figure 4. The values of the log of LAM lie on the straight lines, where
LAM can be thought of as potential productivity. At the peaks it is assumed that
JF · HF equals JF · HF a . Given an estimate of LAM for each quarter and
given data on Y , Y /LAM , which will be denoted JHM IN , is the estimate of the
number of worker hours required to produce the output of the quarter.
Hours paid per worker, HF , fluctuates much less over the business cycle than
does JF . Over time HF has a downward trend. A variable, denoted HF S, was
constructed from peak-to-peak interplations of HF . This variable will be called
the “desired” number of hours. It is an estimate of the average number of hours
firms would want to pay per worker absent business cycle considerations.
7

Figure 4
Peak-to-Peak Interpolation of the Log of Productivity
1952.1--2017.4
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This variable is used in the equations explain-

ing JF and HF below.
A similar procedure is followed in the construction of the model for estimating
excess capital—from peak-to-peak interpolations of Y /KK, but in the interests of
space this will not be discussed here. (See M M [Section 6.3.9].) The focus here
is on labor productivity.
Potential Labor Productivity
The view behind the above specification is that technical progress is primarily embodied in new machines with lower worker/machine ratios. This is approximated
by the peak-to-peak interpolations of output per worker hour. In this formulation
potential labor productivity is always increasing. It is not cyclical, as is actual
productivity. Actual productivity falls when output falls and excess labor is being build up, and it may rise rapidly when output rises and excess labor is being
drawn down. The fluctuations in actual productivity are sometimes referred to as
“‘shocks” in the literature, but this is misleading because they are endogenous.
Changes in potential labor productivity can be considered as shocks in this sense,
but they are small and always positive.
Figure 4 shows that potential productivity growth was higher in the 1950’s
and 1960’s than since, something that is well known. The growth rate in the two
decades ending in 2010 is estimated at 2.0 percent in the figure. Between 1973.1
and 1992.4 it was 1.6 percent, again a well known slow growth. What about since
2010? A peak has probably not been reached by 2017.4, but it clearly looks like
there has been a smaller growth rate since 2010. The figure uses 1.0 percent. This
is a considerable decline from 2.0 percent, but it may be even lower.
No attempt is made in this paper to try to explain the possible decline in potential productivity growth since 2010. Explaining changes in long-run trends is
important, but this is beyond the essentially business cycle considerations of this
9

paper. An interesting recent paper examining long-run changes in the U.S. employment/population ratio is Abraham and Kearney (2018). Some of the factors that
they cite could also affect potential productivity. Schmalensee (2018) shows that
there was a large decline in productivity growth between 1990–2000 and 2010–
2016 for computers and electronic products, due mostly to sharp slowdowns in the
decline of the deflators for these products. These changes are large enough to affect
the aggregate productivity numbers. These changes could be due to measurement
problems or structural changes in the industries, and they may have an effect on
aggregate potential productivity.
For the solutions in Section 3 three assumptions about potential productivity
growth since 2010 have been used: 0.5, 1.0, and 1.5 percent. The main point
of this paper, namely that the output prediction errors are within what one would
expect historically, is not sensitive to these values. It will be seen that predictions
of employment and the unemployment rate are sensitive to the use of 1.5 percent—
they are not as good.
Labor Demand and Labor Supply Equations
The two labor demand equations explain JF and HF . The four labor supply
equations explain the labor force participation of men 25-54, women 25-54, and all
others, L1, L2, and L3, and the number of people holding two jobs (moonlighters),
JM . The labor demand equations are in Table 2, and the labor supply equations
are in Table 3.
The estimated equation for JF is based on the following two equations:
log(JF ∗ /JF−1 ) = α0 log[JF/(JHM IN/HF S)]−1
+α1 ∆ log Y,
log(JF/JF−1 ) − log(JF−1 /JF−2 ) =

λ[log(JF ∗ /JF−1 )

− log(JF−1 /JF−2 )] + ,

10

(2)

(3)

Table 2
Coefficient Estimates for Jobs (JF) and Hours (HF)
∆ log JF
cnst
log[JF/(JHM IN/HF S)]−1
∆ log Y
∆ log JF−1

-0.00008
(-0.11)
-0.0406
(-3.39)
0.345
( 4,63)
0.567
(12.61)

log(HF/HF S)−1

∆ log HF
-0.00485
(-6.07)
-0.0170
(-1.69)
0.279
( 5.25)

-0.153
(-5.42)
0.00001
(4.91)

T
D593

-0.0168
(-4.74)

SE
R2
DW

0.00332
0.705
2.21

0.00268
0.318
2.11

•t-statistics are in parentheses.
•Estimation period is 1954.1–2017.4.
•Estimation method is 2SLS.
•Variables are listed in Table 1: JF = jobs, HF = hours
per job, JHM IN = required worker hours,
HF S = desired hours per job, Y = output,
T = time trend, D593 = dummy variable.
where α0 is negative and the other coefficients are positive. The construction of
JHM IN and HF S and the excess labor variable is explained above.
JF ∗ in equation (2) is interpreted as the number of workers the firm would
desire to have on hand in the current quarter if there were no costs of changing
employment. The desired change, log(JF ∗ /JF−1 ), depends on the amount of
excess labor on hand and the change in output. This equation says that the desired
11

number of workers approaches JHM IN/HF S in the long run if output is not
changing. Equation (3) is a partial adjustment equation of the actual number of
workers to the desired number.
Combining equations (2) and (3) yields:
∆ log JF = λα0 log[JF/(JHM IN/HF S)]−1 + (1 − λ)∆ log JF−1
+λα1 ∆ log Y + .

(4)

The equation in Table 2 is the estimated version of equation (4). It has a dummy
variable, D593, added to pick up the effects of a steel strike.
All the variables are significant in the JF equation except the constant term.
For example, excess labor is a significant factor in explaining the demand for jobs.
The estimate of 1 − λ is .567, and so the implied value of λ is .433. The estimate
of λα0 is -.041, and so the implied value of α0 is -.095. This is the estimate of the
size of the effect of excess labor on the desired number of workers.
The ideas behind this employment demand equation and the hours demand
equation discussed next go back 50 years to my Ph.D. dissertation, Fair (1969).
See also Fair (1985), which shows that the aggregate equations are consistent with
the survey results of Fay and Medoff (1985). These two equations have held up
remarkably well over the years.
The estimated equation for HF is:
∆ log HF = λ log(HF−1 /HF S−1 )
+α0 log[JF/(JHM IN/HF S)]−1 + α1 ∆ log Y + .

(5)

The first term on the right hand side of equation (5) is the (logarithmic) difference
between the actual number of hours paid for in the previous quarter and the desired
number. The reason for the inclusion of this term in the hours equation but not
in the employment equation is that, unlike JF , HF fluctuates around a slowly
trending level of hours. This restriction is captured by the first term in (5). The
other two terms are the amount of excess labor on hand and the current change in
output. Both of these terms affect the employment decision, and they should also
12

affect the hours decision since the two are closely related. The HF equation in
Table 2 is the estimated version of equation (5). The estimate of λ is −.153, and
the estimate of α0 is −.017.
The labor supply equations are consistent with the standard household utility
maximization model. Labor supply depends on the real wage and wealth, where the
effect of wealth is unambigously negative because it is a pure income effect, but the
effect of the real wage can go either way depending on the size of the income and
substitution effects. Wealth appears in all three labor force participation equations,
but the real wage was only important in the L3 equation. The unemployment rate
was added to each equation to pick up potential discouraged worker effects. The
wealth variable, AA, is the real value of net household financial and housing wealth.
Its main fluctuations are from fluctuations in stock price and housing prices. It is
discussed in Section 3. The theory is that this variable should have a negative effect
on labor supply.
The first equation in Table 3 explains the labor force participation rate of men
25-54. It is in log form and includes as explanatory variables the wealth variable
and the unemployment rate. As just noted, the unemployment rate is meant to
pick up a discouraged worker effect. The wealth variable has a negative coefficient
estimate, as expected, as does the unemployment rate. All the coefficient estimates
are significant.
The second equation explains the labor force participation rate of women 2554. It is in log form and includes as explanatory variables the wealth variable,
the unemployment rate, and a time trend. In addition, the constant term and the
coefficient of the time trend are assumed to be time varying. (See M M [Section
2.3.2] for the treatment of time varying coefficients.) This is handled by adding
cnst2 and cnst2·T as explanatory variables. There is an economically unexplained
trend in L2, especially in the 1970’s, due to social movements, which is the reason
the time trend is added. As in the first equation, the wealth variable has a negative
coefficient estimate, as does the unemployment rate, although the t-statistic for the
13

Table 3
Coefficient Estimates for the L1, L2, L3, and LM Equations

cnst
ldv
log(AA/P OP )−1
UR

log(L1/P OP 1)

log(L2/P OP 2)

log(L3/P OP 3)

log(LM/P OP )

0.0258
(3.08)
0.925
(38.49)
-0.00586
(-3.10)
-0.0393
(-2.73)

-0.0377
(-0.97)
0.892
(44.38)
-0.01281
(-1.82)
-0.1341
(-3.79)

0.0414
(2.10)
0.973
(70.73)
-0.01253
(-2.35)
-.1282
(-3.97)
0.0161
(2.26)

-0.239
(-4.14)
0.908
(44.92)

0.00521
0.987
2.10

0.0481
0.945
2.10

log(W A/P H)
T

0.00038
(6.37)
0.0692
(5.38)
-0.00032
(-6.00)

cnst2
cnst2 · T
SE
R2
DW

-1.168
(-4.31)

0.00240
0.994
2.23

0.00498
0.999
2.22

•ldv = lagged dependent variable.
•t-statistics are in parentheses.
•Estimation period is 1954.1–2017.4.
•Estimation method is 2SLS.
•Variables are listed in Table 1.

wealth variable is only -1.82. The time trend is highly significant.
The third equation explains the labor force participation rate of all others 16+.
It is also in log form and includes as explanatory variables the real wage, the
wealth variable, and the unemployment rate. All the coefficient estimates are
significant. The coefficient estimate of the real wage is positive, which suggests
that the substitution effect dominates, and the coefficient estimates of the wealth
variable and the unemployment rate are negative.
The fourth equation determines the number of moonlighters. It is in log form
and includes the unemployment rate as an explanatory variable. The coefficient
14

estimate of the unemployment rate is negative and significant, which is the discouraged worker effect applied to moonlighters.
The total number of people employed in the economy, denoted E, is equal to
the total number of jobs minus the number of moonlighters:
E = JF + JG + JM + JS − JM

(6)

where JG is the number of federal civilian jobs, JM is the number people in the
military, and JS is the number of state and local jobs. The unemployment rate,
U R, is then
UR =

L1 + L2 + L3 − E
L1 + L2 + L3

(7)

3 Solutions of the Model
The model was solved using stochastic simulation as explained in the appendix.
This allows standard errors of the predictions to be computed. The solution period
is 2009.4–2017.4. The quarter 2009.4 is the first quarter that the recovery began.
This solution uses actual values of the exogenous variables, and so it is not
a prediction that could be made in real time. (Also, the solution is not outside
the estimation period.) The solution asks the question that, conditional on the
exogenous variables, what does the model predict about the recovery?
The main exogenous variables are government policy variables, population
and age distribution variables, exports, and the price of imports. Three of the main
government spending variables have been plotted in Figures 1–3.
A key variable in the US model is AA, the total real net financial and housing
wealth of the household sector. It appears in the three labor force participation
equations in Table 3. It is also an important explanatory variable in the three
consumption equations and the housing investment equation in the model (lagged
one quarter). There are large estimated wealth effects in the equations. Changes
in AA are primarily affected by changes in stock prices and changes in housing
15

prices. AA is also affected by the saving of the household sector, but most of the
fluctuations in AA are due to capital gains or loses on stocks and housing.
log(AA/P OP ) is plotted in Figure 5 for the 1990.1–2017.4 period. Figure 5
shows that since 1995 there have been huge fluctuations in financial and housing
wealth, which is well known. What is important for present purposes is that AA
has risen substantially since 2010—primarily because of rising stock prices. In
the solution of the model the change in stock prices and the change in housing
prices have been taken to be exogenous. This means that most of the fluctuations
in AA in Figure 5 are exogenous. The solution thus takes into account the increase in wealth in the period. Had smaller values of AA been used, the recovery
would have been predicted to be slower. In practice changes in AA are, of course,
largely unpredictable, since changes in stock prices and housing prices are largely
unpredictable.3
Fed behavior has also been taken to be exogenous. There is an estimated
interest rate rule in the model, and this equation has been dropped. The solution is
thus conditional on actual Fed behavior, which kept interest rates low during this
period.
Finally, the potential productivity variables, LAM and M U H, have been taken
to be exogenous. As discussed in Section 2, an important question is what has been
the growth rate of LAM since 2010? Figure 4 uses 1.0 percent, and this has been
used as the base case. However, solutions have also been run using 0.5 percent
and 1.5 percent to examine the sensitivity of the results to these changes.
For each variable of interest, the growth rate over the 33 quarter interval has
been computed and put at an annual rate. For the unemployment rate the predicted
value in the last quarter has been used. Results are presented in Table 4 for 11
3

There is actually a lot of macro information in Figure 5, at least from the perspective of the US
model. The results in Fair (2004) show that most of the boom in the U.S. economy in the last half
of the 1990s was due to the increase in AA—the wealth effect at work. The results in Fair (2005)
show that much of the sluggish economy in the 2000.4–2004.3 period was due to the fall in AA.
Finally, the results in Fair (2017) show that much of the 2008-2009 recession was due to the huge
fall in AA. In this latter case much of the fall in AA was from the huge decline in housing prices.
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Figure 5
log(AA/POP): Log of Real Net Household Wealth Per Capita
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Table 4
Predictions from the Model

Actual
(1)
Y
JF
HF
P ROD
L1
L2
L3
LM
E
UR
GDP D

2.55
1.54
0.25
0.74
-0.13
-0.11
1.43
4.22
1.13
4.09
1.65

g(LAM ) = 1.0
Pred. Error
SE
(2)
(3)
(4)

g(LAM ) = 0.5
Pred. Error
(5)
(6)

g(LAM ) = 1.5
Pred. Error
(7)
(8)

2.76
1.39
0.32
1.03
-0.15
-0.10
1.26
4.54
0.97
4,82
1.71

2.73
1.62
0.32
0.87
-0.13
-0.01
1.36
5.31
1.13
4.10
1.82

2.78
1.24
0.31
1.31
-0.19
-0.19
1.15
3.69
0.79
5.62
1.58

0.21
-0.15
0.07
0.29
-0.02
0.01
-0.17
0.32
-0.16
0.73
0.06

0.234
0.316
0.074
0.231
0.089
0.166
0.297
1.857
0.232
1.078
0.256

0.18
0.08
0.07
0.13
0.00
0.10
-0.07
1.09
0.00
0.01
0.17

0.23
-0.30
0.06
0.57
-0.06
-0.08
-0.28
-0.53
-0.34
1.53
-0.07

•Dynamic stochastic simulation for 2009.4–2017.4.
•Values are growth rates over the 33 quarters at an annual rate except for U R.
•The U R value is the prediction for 2017.4.
•Values are mean values from the stochastic simulation, 2000 trials.
•SE = estimated standard error of the prediction.
•SE roughly the same for g(LAM ) = 0.5 and 1.5.
•Variables are listed in Table 1.

variables. The first column lists the actual values and the second column lists the
predicted values. The prediction error is in the third column and the estimated
standard error of the prediction in the fourth column.
With one exception the predicted values are within one standard error of the
actual values. The exception is productivity, where the error is 0.29 and the standard
error is 0.231. Output growth is overpredicted—2.76 percent versus 2.55 percent
actual—but not by much. Job growth is underpredicted—1.39 percent versus
1.54 percent, although hours growth is overpredicted—0.32 percent versus 0.25
percent. The net effect of these is that productivy growth was overpredicted—1.03
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percent versus 0.74 percent—because output was overpredicted and employment
was underpredicted. The labor force participation variables were predicted well.
One reason for the predictions of sluggish labor force growth is the increase in
the wealth variable, AA. The unemployment rate at the end of the period was
predicted to be 4,82 percent, which compares to the actual value of 4.09 percent.
This error is primarily due to the fact that job growth was underpredicted. But
again these are all within a standard error.
In column (5), where the growth rate of LAM is lowered to 0.5 percent, the
predicted value of output is little affected, but the growth rate of jobs is now larger.
In this run there is less excess labor since potential productivity is less, which
leads firms to hire more—remember that excess labor has a negative effect on
employment demand. For this run the predicted value of the unemployment rate
at the end of the period is essentially perfect—4.10 percent versus 4.09 percent.
When the growth rate of LAM is increased to 1.5 percent in column (7),
output growth is again little affected, but the growth rate of jobs is now lower
because excess labor is larger. The predicted unemployment rate at the end is
5.62 percent versus 4.09 percent actual. The larger unemployment rates in this
run lead the predicted values of the labor supply variables to be smaller because
of the discouraged worker effect. This run is the least accurate of the three for the
employment variables.
An important point about the results in Table 4 is that output growth is not
sensitive to assumptions about potential productivity. Output growth is accurately
predicted in all three cases. Job growth and the unemployment rate are fairly
well predicted in the first two cases, but if potential productivity really grew at
1.5 percent, the model noticeably underpredicts job growth and overpredicts the
unemployment rate.
Finally, to give a little more detailed picture of the results, Figures 6–8 plot for
the 2009.4–2017.4 period the actual and predicted values of output, productivity,
and the unemployment rate along with one standard error bands. The predicted
19

values are for the growth rate of LAM of 1.0 percent. For the most part the actual
values are within the error bands. Output was underpredicted in the first half and
overpredicted in the second. Productivity was overpredicted beginning about 2013
by about a standard error. The unemployment rate was generally overpredicted,
but quite accurate from 2015 on.

4 Conclusion
This paper has attempted to provide a casual explanation of the slow output growth
after the 2008–2009 recession, namely sluggish government spending. According
to the model, conditional on wealth, monetary policy, and fiscal policy, output grew
about as expected during this period. On the plus side were the larger than average
rise in wealth and easy monetary policy. On the minus side was the sluggish
government spending. The net effect was a sluggish recovery.
The puzzle regarding the relationship between output and the unemployment
rate is not a puzzle unless the growth rate of potential productivity is about 1.5
percent or greater. More time is needed before one has a good estimate of this rate
since 2010. Although for present purposes, essentially business cycle analysis, the
assumption of exogenous potential labor productivity growth is unlikely to bias the
results much, an important area of research is to explain why potential productivity
growth may have slowed.
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Figure 6
Actual and Predicted Y and Standard Error Bands
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Figure 7
Acltual and Predicted PROD and Standard Error Bands
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Figure 8
Actual and Predicted UR and Standard Error Bands
2009.4--2017.4
.10
.09
<------------------predicted

.08
actual--------------------->

.07
.06
.05

21
.04
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Appendix
Computing Standard Errors
There are 25 estimated equations in the US model, but two of these have been
dropped for purposes of this paper—the capital gains equation and the Fed rule.
This gives 23 equations. The estimation period is 1954.1–2017.4, 256 quarters.
For each estimated equation there are 256 estimated residuals. Let ût denote the
23-dimension vector of the estimated residuals for quarter t, t = 1, ..., 256.4
The solution period is 2009.4–2017.4, 33 quarters. The model was solved 2,000
times for this period. Each trial is as follows. First, 33 error vectors are drawn
with replacement from the 256 error vectors ût , t = 1, ..., 256. These errors are
added to the equations and the model is solved dynamically for the 2009.4–2017.4
period. The predicted values are recorded. This is one trial. This procedure is then
repeated 2,000 times, which gives 2,000 predicted values of each variable. The
mean and standard error are then computed for each variable. See M M [Sections
2.6 and 2.7] for more details.

4

If the initial estimate of an equation suggests that the error term is serially correlated, the
equation is reestimated under the assumption that the error term follows an autoregressive process
(usually first order). The structural coefficients in the equation and the autoregressive coefficient
or coefficients are jointly estimated (by 2SLS). The ût error terms are after adjustment for any
autoregressive properties, and they are taken to be iid for purposes of the draws.
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